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I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Kuhn provided the world with new insights into the nature
of scientific theories in his classic text, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions.' In his postscript to the second edition, Kuhn described
paradigms as accounts of the world shared by members of a pertinent
scientific community.2 He noted that paradigms "supply the group
with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors" which "help
to determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-
solution" for problems that the pertinent scientific community faces.3
Scientists view shared metaphors and analogies as the means for
solving future problems or "test-cases." According to Kuhn,
paradigms help students to see problems as being like those that they
have seen before.4 By working through test cases, the student gains a
"group-licensed way of seeing."5 This permits the student, for exam-
ple, to identify the equation "f=ma" and apply it to countless particular
instances.
In the law, professors, practitioners, and judges use metaphors and
analogies not only to examine the particular cases before them, but also
to determine how to interpret future cases. Yet, unlike scientists or
poets, judges often use metaphors in legal decisions to create obscurity
rather than clarity.6
Over the years, metaphors have increasingly become part of the
scientific landscape as scientists have attempted to describe those
things that we cannot see. Likewise, poets have long used metaphors
to describe the unseeable or directly unknowable in terms of the know-
able. Both scientists and poets use metaphor to provide understand-
ing. By contrast, the use of metaphors in the law has not provided
such understanding. One legal scholar has claimed that "[t]here is a
residual mystery to the process of meaning of our legal metaphors,"
that both metaphors and law are essentially paradoxical, and that legal
metaphors function as figures of speech rather than true metaphors.
7
1. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
2. Id. at 182.
3. Id. at 184.
4. Id. at 189.
5. Id.
6. ARISTOTLE, Topics, Bk. III, 139b34, in W.K.C. GUTHRIE, THE LATER PLATO AND THE
ACADEMY 112 (1978) ("What is expressed in metaphor is always obscure.").
7. Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1076-77 (1989).
Nevertheless, one must admit that "[tihe power of a metaphor is that it colors and
controls the subsequent thinking about its subject." Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1383 (1988).
The appeal of an effective metaphor is almost irresistible to one whose position is
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Metaphors should provide understanding, not confusion.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not often used metaphors in this
fashion. In fact, this Article argues that the Supreme Court's use of
metaphor is unique in that the Court generally uses metaphor to
deceive rather than to enlighten the reader. Because the Court's use of
metaphors gives a "group licensed way of speaking" rather than a
"group licensed way of seeing," its metaphors lack explanatory power.
This Article takes the position that the Court should abandon its pre-
sent approach to the use of metaphors and instead should follow the
scientific and poetic approach in order to promote better understanding
of the law.
This Article examines several popular metaphors that the Supreme
Court uses and reveals their relative merit as guides for judges, legal
scholars, and practitioners. Part II examines the Court's "rational
basis test" metaphor; part III examines the Court's "wall of separation"
metaphor; and part IV examines the Court's "bundle of sticks"
metaphor. The Article proceeds with the view that one of the Supreme
Court's primary roles is to interpret the Constitution by "creating a
framework within which individuals more confidently and freely can
formulate and carry out their personal and social projects."8 In other
words, it is the Court's role to provide guidelines for action.
Opponents of clear metaphors argue that instead of developing
rules, courts should dispense justice through case-by-case analysis. 9
Advocates of rules and general principles, however, argue that judges,
especially Supreme Court Justices, should set forth principles to dis-
pense justice (i.e. equality) and provide predictability.' 0 Without
disputing either position, this Article argues that the Court's use of
metaphors is an attempt to set forth principles or at least to create the
impression that the Court is principled. The Article demonstrates,
however, that while the Court's use of the "rational basis test" appears
to embody an objective principle, it is frequently used to mask ad hoc
decisions of the Court. Similarly, the Court's misuse of the "wall of
separation" metaphor in the church and state context has resulted in
considerable clouding of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and has
done little to clarify important constitutional issues of church and state
relations. On the other hand, the "bundle of sticks" metaphor, used in
bolstered through its use.
8. Steven Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 72-73
(1991). See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
9. Scalia, supra note 8, at 1176.
10. Id. at 1178-79.
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the property rights context, has served as a useful metaphor in provid-
ing guidance and understanding to courts and practitioners.
Ultimately, the Article attempts to answer the question: should the
Court use metaphors and, if so, what purpose should metaphors
serve?
This investigation will reveal that the Court's use of metaphors in
First and Fourteenth Amendment cases is an attempt to mask what the
Court seems unwilling to admit: that the Court lacks a paradigm.
Although the Court seems to realize the worthlessness of its metaphors
as guideposts, it nevertheless uses these metaphors to mask the ran-
dom nature of its decisions as it projects an appearance of scientific
objectivity upon the Supreme Court's decisions.
II. THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
A. What is a "Test?"
One of the common metaphors in modem constitutional law is that
of a "test." Ordinarily, one thinks of a test as a well articulated proce-
dure designed to check compliance with certain standards, as in the
testing of a product or a laboratory result. The word "test" evolved
from the thirteenth century, when it was used to describe an item used
by metalsmiths to determine the purity of alloys of gold and silver." It
has passed into our language as meaning "that by which the existence,
quality or genuineness of anything is or may be determined."'' 2 The
word "test" is commonly used in several contexts-for example,
doctors test their patients' reactions and law professors test their
students. When used in these ways, the word "test" retains two basic
aspects. First, it involves the application of uniform standards. Thus,
in testing a patient's eyesight, a doctor compares the patient's vision to
that of a normal person at twenty feet. Second, because it involves
uniform standards, a test is thought to have a degree of objectivity.
This suggests that different persons performing the same process on
an identical object will achieve similar, if not identical, results. If they
do not, one does not question the validity of the test itself; rather, the
explanation is thought to lie in the manner in which different people
perform the same test. Therefore, in order to have a test, one must
establish procedures and criteria by which one may determine whether
an object or concept has met a given standard. 3
11. XVIII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 825 (2d ed. 1989).
12. Id.
13. This description of a test is not meant to be all encompassing, but merely to
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B. The "Test" in the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court's use of the word "test" stretches the metaphor
so far beyond its meaning that it becomes almost meaningless. This
point is perhaps no more apparent than in the Court's use of the
"rational basis test" metaphor in Fourteenth Amendment analysis. A
survey of several cases reveals the uselessness of the "test" metaphor
as a means of promoting better understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court first used the term "rational basis test" in
Thomas v. Collins,'4 which involved the appeal of a petition for
habeas corpus.' 5  Petitioner Thomas, president of the United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implements Workers Union,
was cited for contempt of court and ordered to spend three days in jail
for violating a temporary restraining order issued by the Texas District
Court for Travis County.' 6 The court had issued the order pursuant to
a Texas law which prohibited persons from soliciting others for union
membership without first obtaining an organizer's card.' 7 Before the
Supreme Court, Thomas argued that his prosecution under this law
violated both his First Amendment rights as incorporated via the
Fourteenth Amendment and his Fourteenth Amendment right of equal
protection of the laws.
8
The State of Texas, on the other hand, likened its attempt to regulate
union solicitation practices to various state attempts to regulate
commercial transportation, and it urged the Court to apply the
"Commerce Clause" standard to determine whether the statute passed
muster under the Federal Constitution. 9 The Court summarized the
state's argument as one calling for the application of a "'rational basis'
highlight the basic aspects of something generally called a test.
14. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
15. Id. at 518.
16. Id. at 518-24.
17. Id. at 521. The Texas statute generally required all labor union organizers in the
state to request and obtain a registration card before soliciting persons for union
membership. The statute also required labor organizers to carry the card whenever they
engaged in the practice of labor organizing. Failure to comply with the statute was a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000, sixty days confinement in the
county jail, or both. Id. at 519 n.l.
In anticipation of a well-publicized speech, during which Thomas was to encourage
particular individuals to join a union, the trial court specifically enjoined Thomas from
soliciting members before first obtaining an organizer's card. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 521
n.3. Thomas violated the order and was arrested. Id. at 522-23.
18. Id. at 518.
19. Id. at 527. Note that the "Commerce Clause" standard is also a metaphor.
1994] 361
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test.920
It is difficult to ascertain why the Court chose to characterize the
"Commerce Clause" standard as a test. Nonetheless, with the growth
of science before and during the Second World War, the idea that a
legal standard could be considered a "test" must have been an engaging
metaphor for the Court. The Court refused to apply the "Commerce
Clause" standard but instead determined that the nature of the liberties
at stake called for a different criteria: "whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at an appropriate time and
place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending.'
This description of the standard by which the Court judged the
constitutionality of the statute at issue in Thomas is deficient for two
reasons. First, the criteria are unclear. Although the Court held that
the legality of the statute turned on whether the discussion restrained
by the State occurred at an "appropriate time and place" and whether
there was "clear support" for the State's action,22 the Court failed to
define either of these criteria. The mere articulation of the criteria by
which the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the statute in Thomas
does not alone indicate that the Court would reach a particular result.
Thus, to understand how the Court would interpret these criteria, it
would be necessary to look beyond the Court's articulated standard to
the actual application of the criteria to the statute at issue in Thomas.
This raises a second problem. At the time it announced the standard
in Thomas, the Court used a descriptive approach to Fourteenth
Amendment protections that set forth several concepts so nuanced that
one could only understand them by applying the stated principles to the
particular facts at issue. Because these criteria were so susceptible to
yielding different results based on minute and subtle variations in the
particular facts at issue, no lawyer who had read Thomas at the time
would have expected subsequent applications of this case to be objec-
tive, despite the Court's use of the word "test."
Although the term "rational basis test" did not appear until 1945, the
Court had discussed tests at least ten years before Thomas. In
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell,23 the Court faced
the issue of whether an Indiana statute that discriminated between
domestic and out-of-state insurers was constitutionally valid. 4 The
20. Id.
21. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530.
22. Id.
23. 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
24. Id. at 582.
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Court stated that the "ultimate test of validity is not whether foreign
corporations differ from domestic, but whether the differences
between them are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the
classification is made. 25 The Court failed to define "pertinent," how-
ever. Moreover, its attempt to clarify what "differences" may serve as
legitimate bases for differing treatment established such a broad stan-
dard that the term was useless. According to the Court, "[i]f those
differences have any rational relationship to the legislative command,
the discrimination is not forbidden. 26 Certainly, few lawyers will
lack the ability to find any rational basis for a law that discriminates
between residents and non-residents. Thus, in Brownell, the Court's
analysis informs the lawyer only that legislation that treats corporations
differently merely on the basis of whether the corporations are foreign
or domestic violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The metaphorical use of the word "test" adds nothing to the Court's
description of the legal standard to be applied. Its use is even more
devoid of meaning in light of the Court's statement that discrimination
will be upheld if it bears "any rational relationship to the legislative
command" 27 and "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."' 28 These broad pronouncements eviscerate the concept of a
test.
In its elaboration of the test, the Court added new language to the
analysis: the word "reasonabl[e], 29 which is often used interchange-
ably with "rational." "Reasonable" is an ambiguous word which,
when coupled with the word "test," produces a term that appears
almost as oxymoronic as "substantive due process." The key to the
outcomes of subsequent cases in this area, as will be discussed, is not
whether a law is "rational," but whether the law is subject to a "rational
basis" analysis.
The use of the "test" metaphor in this context thus has become
meaningless. Instead of using it as a source of illumination and
enrichment, the Court has used the word "test" and its sense of objec-
tivity in the scientific world to hide arbitrary decision-making. The
Court's treatment of cases in this area is thus disingenuous. It is anal-
ogous to scientists performing a test, even though they already know
the results, or teachers conducting exams even though the outcomes
have been predetermined. As certain examples of the Court's applica-
25. Id. at 583.
26. Id.
27. Brownell, 294 U.S. at 583.
28. Id. at 584.
29. Id.
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tion or non-application of the "rational basis" test illustrate, such
applications are not "tests" as scientifically or commonly understood.
In one of the most important cases of the 1960s, Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections,30 the Court struck down a state poll tax without
explanation. 3' Distinguishing a case in which it had upheld literacy
testing as a permissible precondition to the right to vote in state elec-
tions, 32 the Court concluded that the poll tax violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and reasoned that "[v]oter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying
this or any other tax. 33 The Court further described wealth as a
"capricious or irrelevant factor" as a measure of voting qualifications, 4
even though, as Justice Black demonstrated in his dissent, the majori-
ty's trivialization of wealth classifications lacked foundation and the
State's requirement of payment of a poll tax might indeed have had
some rational basis.35
Justice Black's dissent reveals the problem with the Court's "equal
protection test" metaphor. In his dissent, Justice Black noted that the
Court's prior decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause,
including the Court's opinion in Breedlove v. Suttles,36 provided
states with "the broadest kind of leeway in areas where they have a
general constitutional competence to act."37 Furthermore, he noted that
the Virginia law, both as written and as applied, did not deny African-
Americans the right to vote.38 In examining the problem with the
30. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
3 1. Id. at 666. At the time, § 173 of the Virginia Constitution directed the Virginia
General Assembly to levy an annual poll tax not to exceed $1.50 on every Virginia resi-
dent 21 years or older. Id. at 664 n.l. Payment of the poll tax, the proceeds of which
were used to fund public schools and for other general purposes, was a precondition of
voting. Id. Virginia residents brought suit against the Virginia State Board of
Elections, contending that the State's poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Id. at 664-65.
32. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665-66. The Court distinguished Lassiter v. Northampton
County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), on the ground that "unlike [the] poll
tax, the 'ability to read and write ... has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot."' Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (quoting Lassiter, 360 U.S. at
51).
33. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. The Court had previously stricken home site and occu-
pation requirements on the same basis. Id. at 667. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963).
34. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
35. Id. at 674-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
36. 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
37. Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting).
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"equal protection test" metaphor, Justice Black noted that all laws treat
certain groups differently from others and that many laws permissibly
discriminate among persons with respect to voting. Justice Black
observed, for example, that the Court had held that States could deny
their citizens the right to vote in state elections on the basis of age or
literacy. 39 He thus concluded that the Constitution permits a state to
enact a poll tax either to collect revenue or to measure a person's inter-
est in the welfare of the state,4° because neither of these is an irrational
reason for the tax.
Although the Court's holding in Harper may have advanced what
many would consider to be better government policy than that embod-
ied in the Virginia poll tax, the Court nevertheless failed to support its
implicit rejection of Breedlove. The Court's decision provides one of
the early glimpses into the fracturing of the Equal Protection Clause,
reflecting the idea that certain "fundamental" rights, including the right
to vote, are protected in ways that "economic" rights are not.4' While
the special protection accorded voting rights explains why the Court
struck down the poll tax in Harper, it does not explain how Harper
differs from Breedlove. The development of a range of Fourteenth
Amendment protections reveals the ultimate uselessness of the "test"
notion. As virtually all the later decisions make clear, the actual test
occurs when the Court decides which level of scrutiny to apply to a
given law. The Justices decide this preliminary but critical question
only on the basis of their personal views regarding what constitutes a
fundamental right or a special class. The revelation that the Justices'
personal preferences, rather than some objective test, are at the heart of
the Court's constitutional analysis demonstrates the general ad hoc
nature of the Court's decisions.
The Court's opinion in Craig v. Boren42 illustrates this point. In
Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that discriminated
between men and women with respect to the minimum age for the sale
of beer containing 3.2% alcohol.43 The Court described the appropri-
39. Id. at 673 (Black, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 674 (Black, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 666-67 (characterizing the right to vote as fundamental and advocating
careful scrutiny of infringements of that right).
42. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
43. Id. at 191-92. Oklahoma had enacted legislation prohibiting the sale of "'non-
intoxicating"' beer (beer containing 3.2% alcohol) to females under the age of 18 and to
males under the age of 21. Id. The State's articulated purpose for distinguishing between
females and males was the enhancement of traffic safety. Id. at 199. In support of the
gender-based discrimination, the State pointed to evidence showing that more males
than females aged 18-20 had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol;
19941 365
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
ate standard as whether the law "serve[s] important governmental
objectives" and is "substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."44 The Court concluded that the statute at issue failed to satisfy
this intermediate standard of review.45
Justice Stevens' concurrence recognized the problem with the multi-
tiered analysis the majority had adopted. The majority's approach,
Justice Stevens commented, "does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion., 46 He found the law unconstitutional because it
was neither aimed at increasing traffic safety nor did it have a signifi-
cant deterrent effect. 7 Justice Stevens' analysis illuminates the
purpose of the Court's "test" metaphor. Underlying Justice Stevens'
concurrence is the observation that the Court's decisions on constitu-
tional matters are, to a great degree, the product of balancing individual
rights and governmental interests. When, as in Craig, no groups that
have traditionally been subjected to discrimination are involved and no
important rights are implicated, the Court's weighing seems petty.
The Oklahoma legislature should be free to adopt legislation it deems
appropriate to lower the incidence of drunken driving on its state
highways. Justice Rehnquist's forceful dissent espoused this posi-
tion, noting that the Court should have applied the "rational basis" test
to determine whether the legislation at issue in Craig violated the Equal
Protection Clause.48
Justice Steven's concurrence and Justice Rehnquist's dissent
demonstrate that the Court is attached to the test metaphor because it
does not want to appear to be acting like a legislature. Therefore, the
Court applies what it asserts is an objective standard because it wants
to appear to be making an objective determination, even if and when it
is acting like a legislative body. The more the Court engages in
weighing the particular facts of cases, the more it needs to appear
objective to retain its legitimacy. Thus, the less objective its analysis
becomes, the more it insists that some special objective standard
guides its decisions.
more males than females between the ages of 17-21 had been involved in traffic acci-
dents; and that young males were more likely than females to drink beer and drive. Id. at
200-01.
44. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
45. Id. at 199-200.
46. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 213-14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 221-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.49 highlights the Court's
attempt to appear objective in its constitutional interpretation. In
Clover Leaf Creamery, it became apparent that the "rational basis" test
had become a part of the language of constitutional cases. First, the
Court noted that "[t]he parties agree that the standard of review appli-
cable to this case under the Equal Protection Clause is the familiar
'rational basis' test."'50 The Court then explained that the test involves
an inquiry into whether the legislation's classifications are rationally
related to the statute's legitimate purposes.5'
This "test," however, is not a test in any sense, as the Court's own
analysis reveals. The Court noted that the party challenging the consti-
tutionality of the classifications in the statute at issue bore the burden
of showing "'that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker.' ' '12 Given the variety in viewpoints
among members of state and federal legislatures, it would be nearly
impossible for a court to conclusively determine that a legislature could
not have reasonably conceived that the facts on which the legislation is
based were true. Thus, the Court has established a standard in Equal
Protection Clause cases that is virtually impossible for plaintiffs to
meet. Two cases further highlight this problem.
In Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,53 the Court
expanded the "rational basis" test. In Crenshaw, a Mississippi statute
required appellants who had unsuccessfully appealed money judg-
ments entered against them to pay appellees an additional fifteen
percent of the judgment rendered against them by the trial court.54 The
petitioner challenged this law under the Equal Protection Clause
because it singled out appellants involved in money judgments.55 The
Supreme Court reviewed this challenge under the "rational basis"
test.56 Under this test, legislation is presumed valid and will be upheld
if the challenged classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.5 7 The Court noted that the Mississippi law served several
legitimate state interests, including preventing a squeeze on successful
49. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
50. Id. at 461.
51. Id. at 462-63.
52. Id. at 464 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
53. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
54. Id. at 80.
55. Id. at 81.
56. Id.
57. Id.
19941 367
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
parties, discouraging frivolous appeals, providing compensation to
successful appellees, and conserving judicial resources. 5p Moreover,
the Court reasoned that because appeals involving money judgments
are easily assessed a fifteen percent penalty while other types of judg-
ments cannot be assessed as easily, the classification was rational.59
Accordingly, the Court upheld the statute.6°
The decision reveals the vacuity of the notion that the Court was
conducting a "test." As the petitioners argued, the state's classification
treated with prejudice parties who appealed the entry of money judg-
ments against them.61 Mississippi could have written a fairer law-at
least with respect to the stated purposes behind the challenged
statute-that could have required all losing appellants to pay the
appellee's attorney fees, or that could have imposed other sanctions.
The state legislature, however, instead chose to adopt a law that
singled out appellants of money judgments. The Court accepted the
discriminatory treatment imposed by the Mississippi statute because
the percentage of the penalty did not appear too high and because the
Court had little interest in protecting the group of people affected.
Although neither of these reasons for upholding a law is necessarily
bad, they reveal that the Court's decision to uphold the law was based
only upon the Justices' personal views. A decision to uphold a law
merely because it does not disturb members of the Court can only be
characterized as ad hoc.
Finally, in one of the most interesting recent equal protection cases,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,62 the Court resolved a
situation in which the State of Texas refused to provide a special use
permit to a home for mentally handicapped persons.63 The Supreme
Court's majority opinion noted that the court of appeals had incorrectly
applied an intermediate scrutiny standard rather than applying the
58. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 81-82.
59. Id. at 83-84.
60. Id. at 85.
61. Id. at 80-81.
62. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
63. Id. at 435. The permit was required by a city zoning ordinance that required a
special use permit for the construction of "'[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded,
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions."' Id. at 436
(footnote omitted). After determining that the proposed home fell under the classifica-
tion of a "hospital for the feeble-minded" and holding a public hearing on the permit
application, the city denied the application. Id. at 436-37. The principals behind the
home then filed suit against the city, arguing that the zoning ordinance's classifications
discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 437.
368 [Vol. 25
The Role of Metaphor in Constitutional Cases
"rational basis" test.64 After summarizing the various levels of
scrutiny that apply to different groups and rights,65 the Court refused
to grant the mentally handicapped special protection, in part, because
both federal and state governments had created laws to protect them.66
The Court failed to recognize that such an argument, if taken seriously,
would eliminate special scrutiny for almost all classes and rights.
The determination of the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the
statute ultimately turned on the Court's concern that if it upheld a
special classification for the handicapped, it would open this area of
the law to a variety of suits. 67 If the mentally handicapped deserved
special classification, so too, the Court noted, might "the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. 68 Nevertheless, even
though it applied the "rational basis" test, the Court rejected Cleburne's
zoning regulation because it could find no rational reason to treat the
mentally handicapped differently from other groups that were not
subject to the zoning restrictions.69 Here, unlike in Banker's Life, the
Court was unwilling to allow the local government to make distinc-
tions on the basis of a difference far more substantial than that between
money and non-money judgments. Moreover, the Court seemed to
conclude that the City was using the ordinance to punish the mentally
handicapped despite the City's stated objective that it enacted this legis-
lation to protect them.70
Justice Marshall, who filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, highlighted the point that although the Court
purported to evaluate the ordinance under a "rational basis" test, it
actually used a far more searching inquiry. He opined that
"Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional
rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation' 71
and that Cleburne's standards would stand under the "one step at a
time" rule of Williamson v. Lee Optical72 and its progeny.73 Thus,
64. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
65. Id. at 439-42.
66. Id. at 443-46.
67. Id. at 445-46.
68. Id.
69. Among its reasons for rejecting the home for the handicapped, the City expressed
concern about the "size of the home and the number of people that would occupy it."
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
70. Id. at 448-50.
71. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
73. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489). Justice Marshall's reference was to the rule
that "under the traditional and most minimal version of the rational-basis test, 'reform
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Justice Marshall recognized that the majority opinion opened the door
to a more searching inquiry in cases where the Court had traditionally
applied a more deferential "rational basis" standard.74 In Justice
Marshall's view, the majority failed to provide any justification for this
more exacting "rational basis" scrutiny.7
C. Conclusions on the "Test" Metaphor
As a consequence of the Court's decisions, the notion of a "test"
permeates the discourse of practitioners, professors, and students of
constitutional law. Although the term has become entrenched in
constitutional analysis, it masks the ad hoc nature of Supreme Court
decisions. Interestingly, the "test" metaphor has been extensively used
in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process analysis
and in First Amendment Establishment Clause analysis, even though
these areas of constitutional law are among the most politically charged
and least understandable of the Court's decisions. Few people can
predict the Court's decisions in these areas and even fewer can explain
the Court's reasoning in reaching its decisions. Instead of applying an
objective standard, commentators merely count noses based upon prior
decisions and perceived ideological leanings of Court members.
The so-called tests do not test anything. As every professor of
constitutional law knows, if the Court chooses to apply the "rational
basis" test, the legislation nearly always passes scrutiny. The crucial
analysis, which involves the decision whether to subject the particular
legislation to the "rational basis" test, occurs before the test is even
applied. Far from resting on objective criteria, this process of select-
ing the level of scrutiny for each classification involves policy and
moral judgments.
Therefore, while the Court tries to make its decisions appear
straightforward, its most important decisions are rooted in policy or
ideological leanings. Few of the Court's "tests" actually function as
tests or provide clear and predictable answers to modem legal prob-
lems. Thus, the metaphor of a "test" lacks meaning.
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind."' Id. (quoting Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489).
74. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
75. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. THE WALL OF SEPARATION
A. What is a "Wall?"
The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions have provided the
public and attorneys with the most well-known metaphor of constitu-
tional law: the "wall of separation between church and state." This
metaphorical "wall" invokes a mental image of the Great Wall of
China, the Iron Curtain, or a backyard wall. Each of these walls has
two general but core characteristics. First, a wall is a distinct divider
that provides clear boundaries. Second, a wall actually divides or
separates things. As the following analysis shows, however, the
Court's use of the "wall of separation" metaphor has served neither of
these purposes. The Court has used it neither to clarify nor to divide.
Indeed, it is a metaphor without meaning in the Court's usage.
Thomas Jefferson created the "wall of separation" metaphor on
January 1, 1802, in a letter that he wrote while President to the
Danbury Baptist Association to explain his refusal to declare a national
day of prayer and fasting.76 In that letter, President Jefferson
compared essentially different things by using a metaphor that was to
have a profound impact on the Supreme Court of the United States: "I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State."" Jefferson substituted an impressive figurative phrase for the
literal words of the religion clauses; his metaphor clarified lofty consti-
tutional language, added emotional intensity to a stark quotation, and
succinctly conveyed the writer's feelings and attitude.
76. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
reprinted in SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (2d ed. 1969). Some
have attributed the "wall" metaphor to an earlier source than Jefferson. See Ross, supra
note 7, at 1064. Ross notes that Roger Williams, a seventeenth century colonial advo-
cate of religious tolerance and separatism, wrote of a wall separating "'the garden of the
church and the wilderness of the world[.]' Id. (quoting R. Williams, "Mr. Cotton's
Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered," in P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His
CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 98 (1953)). In Williams' view, the wall was
needed to protect religious institutions from the evils of the secular world. See id.
77. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
reprinted in PADOVER, supra note 76, at 519. The quotation is from the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, which provides in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
1994]
372 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 25
Like all poetic devices, Jefferson's metaphor condensed a wealth of
concepts into a few words. Once in the Court's vocabulary,78 the
"wall of separation" took on a life of its own as the foremost paradigm
of church-state relationships under the Constitution. Although the
frequency with which the Court has cited Jefferson's metaphor has
been erratic79 and the "wall" is currently unpopular with the Court,80
the influence of the concept has been and continues to be pervasive.
The Court has identified the wall almost exclusively with the
Establishment Clause alone,8' despite Jefferson's language to the con-
trary. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Court's difficulties in this area
of constitutional law are almost as infamous as the "wall of separation"
itself.8
2
Whether the Court's use of the "wall of separation" ever coincided
with Jefferson's original meaning is an issue that other commentators
of constitutional law have examined. 3 This Article focuses on what
78. Jefferson's metaphor appeared for the first time in Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878), discussed infra part III.B.
79. The ebb and flow of the Court's use of the "wall" metaphor is outlined in Joel F.
Hansen, Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of
the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 645, 646-48 (1978).
80. The Court's recent opinions either directly or indirectly disclaim any reliance on
the "wall." See Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), discussed infra text accompanying notes 218-51; but
see Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2662 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting
that "[i]n the words of [Thomas] Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State"' (quoting
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citation omitted))). In Wallace, the
majority omitted any reference to the "wall," and Justice Rehnquist's dissent attacked the
metaphor's validity. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114; see also infra note 82.
8 1. The Court has also used the metaphor interchangeably to describe the religion
clauses together and the Establishment Clause alone, even in the same case. See
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16, 18. The Supreme Court's opinion in Everson is discussed infra
part III.C. 1.
82. The Court has often acknowledged that it has encountered problems interpreting
the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("We have done much straining since 1947 [the year in which the Court decided
Everson], but still we admit that we can only 'dimly perceive' the Everson wall.");
Regan, 444 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Establishment Clause cases are not
easy ... and we are divided among ourselves .... "); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that
the Court's approach to Establishment Clause cases lacks "analytical tidiness").
Wolman is discussed infra part III.E.
83. See Hansen, supra note 79, at 651-74; Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off on the
Wrong Foot and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson
Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410,
1449-55 (1990).
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the Court has said and done to Jefferson's metaphor and what
Jefferson's metaphor has done to the Court.
B. The "Wall" Appears
Jefferson's metaphor probably gained its status in the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in part because of its relatively
early appearance in Reynolds v. United States,84 the first major case
presented to the Court for interpretation of the First Amendment's
religion clauses. Reynolds, a Mormon from the Utah Territory,
challenged his conviction under a federal criminal bigamy statute as a
violation of his free exercise rights.8 5 To determine the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom that the Framers
intended, the Court conducted a brief historical review of the period of
time surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment, from which
Thomas Jefferson emerged as the dominant figure.86
In one short paragraph, the Court noted that official religion, taxa-
tion for its support, and laws dictating doctrine, practices, and
punishment for violations had been common in the colonies.87 These
circumstances, the Court observed, had led to a controversy that
culminated in the proposal of a tax bill to the Virginia House of
Delegates in 1784 for the support of Christian teachers.88 In a second
paragraph, the Reynolds Court reported that in opposition to the pro-
posed tax bill, James Madison had written and circulated his
"Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments," 89 a
paper arguing against an assessment in Virginia for the benefit of
religious education. 90 Following this brief discussion of Madison's
Contrary to some popular views, Jefferson was not an advocate of strict separation of
church and state. Jefferson sponsored a bill in the Virginia legislature to punish
Sabbath breakers, and, as President, he allowed federal support of religious missionaries
to Native Americans. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
52 (1991). Ironically, Jefferson closed his letter to the Danbury Baptists with a prayer.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S.
Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in
PADOVER, supra note 76, at 518-19.
84. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
85. Id. at 146, 161-62.
86. Id. at 162-63.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 163. The tax bill is reprinted as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent-
ing opinion in Everson, 330 U.S. at 72 (Rutledge,.J., dissenting).
89. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
2 GALLARD HUNT, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (1901). "Memorial and
Remonstrance" is also reprinted as an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson,
330 U.S. at 63.
90. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
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attitude toward the relationship between the state and religion, the
Court focused on Jefferson.
After the proposed Virginia tax bill was defeated, the Court noted,
Thomas Jefferson drafted and introduced a bill for the establishment of
religious freedom, which the House of Delegates passed in its next
session.9' The Reynolds Court concentrated on the preamble to
Jefferson's second bill, which set forth two concepts central to the
relationship between church and state: first, the state does not have
power over religious opinions and beliefs, lest religious liberty be
destroyed; and second, the State may exercise power when beliefs
become actions that threaten peace and good order.92 After quoting
from the preamble, the Court concluded that "[in these two sentences
is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the
church and what to the State. 93
The Court then cited several additional historical facts to support the
conclusion it had already reached. A little more than a year after
Jefferson's bill was passed, the Court noted, the Constitutional
Convention met, and even though Jefferson was in France at the time,
he commented on the proposed Constitution.94 The Court observed
that although Jefferson was disappointed that the draft of the
Constitution contained no "express declaration insuring the freedom of
religion," he was "willing to accept it as it was, trusting that the good
sense and honest intentions of the people would bring about the neces-
sary alterations." 95 The Court then reported that four states had
proposed constitutional amendments for declarations of religious free-
dom. 96 Accordingly, Madison and other "advocates of religious
freedom" proposed the First Amendment at the first session of the
First Congress, and it was adopted. 97
Finally, the Court considered Jefferson's commentary on the First
Amendment, quoting the entire passage from Jefferson's letter to the
91. Id. Jefferson was in France when the Virginia statute was eventually passed in
1786. See infra note 104.
92. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
93. Id. In his autobiography, Jefferson noted that the bill had finally been enacted
"with some mutilations in the preamble." I THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh, eds., 1903) [hereinafter I WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON].
94. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163..
95. Id. For Jefferson's account of what transpired, see infra note 104.
96. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The states cited by the Court were New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
97. Id.
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Danbury Baptists containing the "wall of separation" metaphor. 98
Without comment, the Court concluded:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advo-
cates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authorita-
tive declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus
secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.99
After a survey of the historically vilified practice of polygamy, the
Court did not hesitate to uphold the conviction."°
This Article appropriately describes the way in which the wall
metaphor found its way into the Court's First Amendment as an
"4appearance '' because the Reynolds Court placed no particular
emphasis on the metaphor. It simply appeared in the Court's opinion
as part of the Court's larger quotation from Jefferson's Danbury
letter. 10 2 Presumably, the Court's silence indicates that it did not view
the metaphor as having any meaning independent of that of the letter
itself, and the letter, in turn, only distinguished between the govern-
ment's ability to legislate against an individual's actions and its abso-
lute inability to exert any power over an individual's religious beliefs
or opinions.
Given this unremarkable beginning, the metaphor may not have
become as prominent as it did but for the Court's general emphasis on
Thomas Jefferson's interpretation of the First Amendment's religion
clauses.'0 3 Even though Jefferson was out of the country for five
years prior to and during the drafting, debating, and finalizing of the
First Amendment, 0 4 the Court relied on Jefferson as the definitive
98. See id. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text for a more thorough discus-
sion of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists.
99. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
100. Id. at 164-66.
101. See supra text accompanying note 84.
102. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
103. See id. at 163-64.
104. Jefferson was appointed "Minister Plenipotentiary" in May 1784, and sailed for
France that July to join Dr. Benjamin Franklin in Paris. 1 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra
note 93, at 89-90. He did not return to the States until November 1789, two months
after Congress had finalized the Bill of Rights. Id. at 160. Jefferson was proud of his
efforts to secure religious liberty in Virginia, but was quick to dispel any notion that he
had played a role in securing religious liberty for the new nation:
I was in Europe when the Constitution was planned, and never saw it until after
it was established. On receiving it I wrote strongly to Mr. Madison, urging
the want of provision for the freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial
by jury, habeas corpus, the substitution of militia for a standing army, and an
express reservation to the States of all rights not specifically granted to the
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source for determining the "scope and effect of the [First] amend-
ment."' ' Although no member of the Court squarely addressed this
historical anomaly for more than one hundred years,"° the Court's
focus on Jefferson in this seminal case secured his role in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence.
Despite its mistake in linking Jefferson to the First Amendment, the
Reynolds Court was not responsible for the metaphor's later identifi-
cation with the Establishment Clause. 0 7 The Court unmistakably
viewed Reynolds as a free exercise case. In its first major attempt to
give substance to the religion clauses, the Court said little about the
passage of the First Amendment. Instead, it was satisfied with a two
paragraph survey of religious history and two writings of Thomas
Jefferson. By framing the issue as it did, the Court found no need to
delve into the words and actions of the First Congress. If it had,
Thomas Jefferson would not have been the focus, and James Madison
would have merited more than a passing mention.108 Because the
particular language extracted from Jefferson's proposed tax bill and the
theme of his letter to the Danbury Baptists provided the Court with all
that it believed necessary to interpret the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court found no need to interpret Jefferson's "wall" metaphor.
Nevertheless, because the Court chose to cite the entire Danbury letter,
the "wall of separation" quietly found its way into constitutional law.
Within the narrow boundaries of a free exercise exemption case, the
Reynolds methodology and the "wall of separation" were relatively
harmless. Once adopted into the broad arena of Establishment Clause
cases, however, the inconsequential deficiencies of Reynolds assumed
constitutionally significant proportions. With Thomas Jefferson cast
Union. He accordingly moved in the first session of Congress for these
amendments, which were agreed to and ratified by the States as they now stand.
That is all the hand I had in what related to the Constitution.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestley (June 19, 1802), quoted in Smith,
supra note 83, at 599.
105. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
106. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. Justice Black first equated Jefferson's metaphor with the Establishment Clause
in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. As a result of Everson, Jefferson's "wall of separation"
became so identified with the Establishment Clause alone that later justices would refer
to Jefferson's metaphor as the Everson "wall." See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107, 112
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 266 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing the Everson "test").
108. James Madison drafted the proposed First Amendment, introduced it, and guided
its passage through Congress. Madison's major role in First Amendment history is
discussed in Smith, supra note 83; McConnell, supra note 83, at 1476-85; and Hansen,
supra note 79, at 651-53. Justice Rehnquist also reviewed Madison's efforts in Wallace,
472 U.S. at 92-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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as the most prominent historical figure in the interpretation of the First
Amendment's religion clauses, the "wall" took on a life of its own
when transferred to Establishment Clause cases.
C. Public Aid to Religious Schools
1. Everson v. Board of Education: Building the "Wall"
Although the "wall of separation" first found its way into the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence innocuously in
Reynolds, its use as a constitutional mandate began in a case involving
aid to religious schools.' 9 Heralded as "high and impregnable,"" i0 the
"wall of separation" meant that the Constitution forbade state financial
support of religious schools as an impermissible advancement of reli-
gion."' While all members of the Court agreed on the premise, 12 the
consensus broke down over the meaning of "support." As a result,
even the first time that the Court used the "wall" metaphor in a school
funding case, it did not interpret the "wall of separation" to be a rigid
barrier preventing all aid to religious schools. At issue in school
funding cases such as Everson was not whether the states could aid
religious schools, but rather how they could do so without
"advancing" religion. The "wall of separation" did not assist the
Court, and over the course of several Supreme Court decisions in this
area, the complexity of the problem caused the "high and impregnable"
wall to become "blurred and indistinct," until finally it was relegated to
a reference in a dissent." 3 In the process, the Court struggled to find a
principled basis for deciding these cases and to understand the real
constitutional implications of public aid for religious schools.
In 1947, the Court spelled out the meaning of the Establishment
Clause for the first time in Everson v. Board of Education." 14 In doing
so, the Court assigned Jefferson's metaphor a meaning without con-
sidering the meaning that Jefferson intended the metaphor to have.
The Court simply took the phrase out of context from Reynolds and
interpreted its use as appropriate only to discern the meaning and scope
109. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. at 16.
112. See, e.g., id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
1 13. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of Justice Black's dissenting opinion, see infra text accompanying
footnotes 144-49.
114. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Although a few earlier cases may have implicated the
Establishment Clause, the issue was never directly addressed. Id. at 43 n.35 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting).
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of the Establishment Clause."I5 This subtle deviation from Jefferson's
actual language allowed the Court to pit the two religion clauses
against each other and set the stage for undermining the very definition
the Court had announced.
In Everson, a New Jersey law permitted the State to reimburse
parents for the cost of their children's bus fare to both public and
parochial schools." 16 Following the Reynolds formula, the Court first
conducted an in-depth historical review of religion in the colonies." 7
It summarized Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" and quoted
from both the preamble and the text of Jefferson's "Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty."" 8 Then, in an often-quoted passage, the Court set
forth six distinct Establishment Clause prohibitions. "9 Although four
of the commands did not provoke disagreement among the justices,
two laid the seedbed for acrimonious debate and barely survived the
five-to-four Everson decision:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
... can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
115. Id. at 16.
116. Id. at 3 n.l. The statute authorized local school boards to "make rules and
contracts" for transporting all students in a district except students of private schools
operated for profit. Id. No equal protection challenge was raised. Everson, 330 U.S. at
4 n.2.
117. Id. at 8-11. Compared to the Reynolds Court, the Everson Court conducted an
expansive historical survey. Although its survey centered on the question of tax support
for religion, the Court also made numerous references to religious persecution. See id.
118. Id. at 12-13. Citing Reynolds, the Court stated that it had "previously recog-
nized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which
Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were
intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious
liberty as the Virginia statute." Id. at 13 (citations omitted). In light of the Court's
difficulties with the Establishment Clause, it is interesting to compare an academic
viewpoint summarizing the Virginia statute:
One should note, however, precisely what comprised the separation of Church
and State in the act of 1785. No one could be legally required to attend any
church or support any ministry. No one could legally suffer any injury in his
body or his goods because of his religious beliefs. All should be free to main-
tain their religious opinions, without benefit or loss from such professions of
belief. In short, there were three factors in the equation: the Church, the
State, and the Individual. The act of 1785 protected the individual from any
loss at the hands of the State because of his relations to the Church. It did not
attempt to define the relations between Church and State except in terms of the
individual. It contained an implicit ban, of course, upon a church establish-
ment, but beyond that it did not go. Efforts to read more into it inevitably
take on the subjective cast of thought of the person who does the reading.
WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 96-97 (1964).
119. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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prefer one religion over another . . . No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion .... In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State.' 120
Having just declared both the "wall" and the Establishment Clause
to be absolutes, the Court effectively denied their absolute status by
holding that the New Jersey statute did not violate the Establishment
Clause.1 2' The Court acknowledged that the law helped children get to
church schools and possibly even resulted in greater church school
enrollment.1 22 Nevertheless, the Court held that these beneficial
effects were only incidental to the State's efforts to insure safety for all
without regard to religion, and thus did not amount to "support" for
the schools.123 In upholding the law, the Court found that a general
welfare law that insured the safety of all school children, such as the
New Jersey statute, was comparable to State funding for police and
fire protection for children. 1
24
The Court insisted that the "wall of separation" guided its decision.
Stating that the First Amendment's wall between church and state
"must be kept high and impregnable" and that not even the "slightest
breach" was permissible, the Court held that New Jersey had not
breached the Establishment Clause wall. 2  The Court's dual use of
the "wall of separation"-first, as a substitute for the Establishment
Clause and then simply as a justification for its decision-effectively
deprived the metaphor of any real meaning. The dissenters noted this
inconsistency, analogizing the majority's decision to "Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent,"-
consented.""' ' 2 ° The most scathing disapproval came from Justice
Rutledge:
I cannot believe that the great author of those words, or the men
who made them law, could have joined in this decision. Neither
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 17-18. Although the Court noted that contributing tax-raised funds to
support religious schools would violate the Establishment Clause, id. at 16, it further
concluded that denying the benefits of a general welfare program to parochial school
children because of their religion would violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause. Id.
122. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
123. See id. at 17-18.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 18.
126. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised
between church and state by Virginia's freat statute of religious
freedom and the First Amendment ....
Justice Rutledge's use of the "wall" was clear: "no aid" meant no
aid. The Court's use of the "wall," by contrast, made little sense and
was particularly groundless as a basis for argument. 128 The Everson
Court never even defined aid, but merely clarified what was not aid.
Thus, Everson provided a negative formula for successful lawmaking.
The "wall," which had sounded so formidable, would not bar general
welfare laws aimed at parents and children where church schools were
secondary beneficiaries.
The Court's use of the "wall" also had more subtle consequences.
Although its historical review seemed to indicate that the Court consid-
ered religious discrimination to be a primary issue in Establishment
Clause cases, 129 the Court's insistence on using the "wall of separa-
tion" as a basis for upholding the law relegated religious discrimination
to a secondary consideration. Furthermore, the Court's reference to
the clash between the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
seems contrived because the Court indicated that states could provide
transportation only to public school children if they so chose. 30
Because the free exercise concern was unnecessary to the Court's
conclusion and thus appeared superficial, Everson became known for
its "high and impregnable wall," rather than for the fact that it took so
little to knock the wall down. This may also explain why free exercise
concerns became so marginalized in later Establishment Clause cases.
One final criticism of the Everson majority is that it perceived only
the law's secular purpose of safety for all school children and the inci-
127. Everson, 330 U.S. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
128. One commentator characterized Justice Black's opinion for the Court as
"enigmatic" because Justice Black's historical analysis noted the strict historical sepa-
ration of Church and State, yet his legal analysis nevertheless led him to conclude that
indirect aid to religious schools was permissible. See Smith, supra note 83, at 638-39.
Professor Smith also noted that Justice Black's opinion was subject to further criticism
because it failed to take advantage of the wealth of historical materials that could have
been used to arrive at the same result in the case. See id. at 639.
129. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-13. The Court traced the development of religious
freedom in America, recalling that the first settlers came to escape the "bondage of laws"
that forced them to practice a certain religion. Id. at 8. The Court then praised the
efforts of early American leaders who fought for religious freedom as a fundamental
American principle. Id. at 11-12.
130. Id. at 16. This would seem to mean that the state could constitutionally enact
educational assistance laws that initially excluded parochial school children, but once
the state extended benefits to all, a free exercise claim would magically arise. This point
was not lost on the dissenters. See id. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Everson, 330
U.S. at 52-60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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dental benefits that the law provided to church schools, and that it
failed to take into account the religious purposes that the statute
served.' The dissenters, by contrast, delved into the history of
sectarian schools and concluded that their primary purpose was to
inculcate religious beliefs. 32 The only factor sustaining the law, the
dissenters argued, was the majority's invalid 33 conclusion that the aid
did not amount to "support" for religion. 34 Noting the religious mis-
sion of the schools and the admitted benefits of the bus service, the
dissenters believed that the bus-fare law aided religion, and thus
violated the Establishment Clause.135 Thus, the majority's "high and
impregnable wall" proved to be no buttress against semantics, and its
location between permissible tax dollars for general welfare and
forbidden tax dollars for religion depended solely on the depth of the
Court's inquiry into the statute's purpose and effect.1
36
2. The "Wall" Becomes a Line: Board of Education v. Allen
The viewpoint of the Everson majority easily prevailed twenty-one
years later in Board of Education v. Allen, 137 much to the dismay of
Justice Black, the author of the Everson opinion. In Allen, the Court
transformed the supposedly absolute "wall" into a "line between state
neutrality to religion and state support of religion," thus making the
separation of church and state required by the Constitution dependent
13 1. This criticism can best be understood by referring to a method of Establishment
Clause inquiry that the Court later followed. Subsequent to Everson, the "wall of separa-
tion" became the source of the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the test that the Court
formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In Lemon, the Court
fashioned a three-part inquiry to try to "add some mortar to Everson's wall." Wallace,
472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Under this test, "[f]irst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1968)) (citations omitted). The
purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test help determine the side of the "wall" on
which a law will fall. The results of a purpose and effect inquiry, however, actually
depend upon the depth of analysis. For a more thorough discussion of the Lemon test,
see infra text accompanying notes 150-65.
132. Everson, 330 U.S. at 21-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting), 46-47 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. at 49, 57 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). According to Justice Rutledge, "in this
realm such a line can be no valid constitutional measure." id. at 48-49.
134. Id. at 45, 56 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
135. Everson, 330 U.S. at 24-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting), 48 (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing).
136. See supra note 131.
137. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The decision, written by Justice White, was split, with
one justice concurring and three justices dissenting.
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on the degree of that separation. 38 This gentler formulation of the
"wall" was irrelevant, however, because despite its substitution of a
"line" for the Everson "wall," the Court nevertheless based its decision
on the Everson rationale.
At issue in Allen was a New York law that allowed public school
boards to approve secular textbooks and lend them free of charge to
both public and parochial school children in grades seven through
twelve.' 39 Using the purpose and effect test that had been formally
approved five years earlier in Abington School District v. Schempp,140
the Allen Court reasoned that Abington's citation to Everson meant that
Everson would have passed the two-prong test.14' The Court recog-
nized that lending books was comparable to providing bus services in
that it furthered the secular goal of providing educational opportunities
for all school children. 4 2 Similarly, the Court deemed the fact that
free books provided by the state might also help church schools to
keep and attract pupils to be constitutionally insignificant.143
In a forceful dissent, Justice Black, the author of the Everson opin-
ion, cited Jefferson's metaphor in full. Describing the New York law
as a "flat, flagrant, open violation" of the Establishment Clause, 44
Justice Black quoted the entire Everson list of establishment prohibi-
tions, including the "wall of separation" language.'45 Yet Justice
Black's distinction between bus fare and books was informed less by
his rigid "wall" concept than by his critical analysis of the law's
purpose and effect. In Justice Black's view, the law providing free
books to parochial schools could only have been the product of
"powerful sectarian religious propagandists" who secured the law to
138. Id. at 242. The Court's characterization of separatiod in terms of degree recalls
Justice Rutledge's "warning" in Everson: "This is not therefore just a little case over bus
fares. [While it may be] distant ... from a complete establishment of religion, it differs
from it only in degree; and it is the first step in that direction." Everson, 330 U.S. at 57
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
139. Allen, 392 U.S. at 238-39.
140. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court stated the test as follows:
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
141. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
142. Id. at 243-44.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 250-51 (Black, J., dissenting).
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help church schools carry on their religious mission. 46  Far from
merely garnering a few more students, Justice Black argued, the
primary effect of this law was to teach and propagate religious view-
points by providing the essential tools of sectarian education. 47 But
Justice Black's strongest objections were grounded in fears of political
strife and the slippery slope concept. He saw no principled way to
distinguish the textbooks in Allen from future tax-funded school
buildings, teacher salaries, and the like. 148 As in his majority opinion
in Everson, Justice Black concluded his dissent in Allen by invoking
the "high and impregnable" wall of separation and by chastising
Justice White's majority opinion. 49
Although it reduced the "wall" to a "line," the Court's reliance on
Everson seemed to prove that the "wall" was even less relevant to the
interpretation of the First Amendment's religion clauses than it had
first appeared. In addition, it bolstered the impression that the Court's
position on public aid programs was flexible. But as Justice Black
persuasively argued, the Court misread the precedent that he had
authored. Upholding the "wall" as a constitutional measuring stick
and using it to castigate the Court therefore proved doubly effective. It
highlighted the fact that a "line" between "general welfare laws" and
"support for religion laws" provided virtually no barrier at all and that
the Court's "line" failed to answer Justice Black's slippery slope
argument. As a result, the Court was spurred to deeper analysis and
146. Allen, 392 U.S. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 252-53 (Black, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 253-54 (Black, J., dissenting). This argument must have caused Justice
Black particular chagrin because Justice Rutledge had made the same argument against
Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson:
Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any the less essential to educa-
tion, whether religious or secular, than payment for tuitions, for teachers'
salaries, for buildings, equipment and necessary materials. Nor is it any the
less directly related, in a school giving religious instruction, to the primary
religious objective all those essential items of cost are intended to achieve.
No rational line can be drawn between payment for such larger, but not more
necessary, items and payment for transportation.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
149. Allen, 392 U.S. at 254 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black wrote that the
Establishment Clause was written:
On the assumption that state aid to religion and religious schools generates
discord, disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people, and that any
government that supplies such aids is to that extent a tyranny . . . . [T]he only
way to protect minority religious groups from majority groups in this country
is to keep the wall of separation between church and state high and impreg-
nable . . . . The Court's affirmance here bodes nothing but evil to religious
peace in this country.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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the "wall" enjoyed a brief resurrection of sorts.
D. Lemon and the Creation of Another Test Metaphor
The states seemed to regard the new "line" and Justice Black's
predictions as direct cues for action. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,150 the
Court considered challenges to a Pennsylvania law that directly reim-
bursed religious schools for secular expenditures on teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials,'' and to a Rhode Island law
that supplemented the salaries of teachers who taught secular subjects
in religious schools.'5 2 Although the prophecies made by Justice
Black in Allen seemed to have materialized, the Court did not respond
by imposing the absolute wall of Everson. Instead, it continued down
the path of Allen. The Court noted that the language of the religion
clauses was "at best opaque," admitted that it could only "dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation,"'5' and concluded that total separa-
tion of church and state was "not possible in an absolute sense."'54
The Court reasoned that establishment issues were best resolved by
focusing on the historic evils the clause was intended to prevent. 55 As
a guide, the Court formulated the so-called Lemon test by combining
into a single, multi-part test the criteria it had used to evaluate the
constitutionality of state statutes in two earlier cases. From Walz, the
Court adopted the criterion that the statute must not foster "'excessive
government entanglement with religion.'"56 The balance of the
Lemon test consisted of the "purpose and effect" inquiries that the
150. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
151. Id. at 609. Pennsylvania specifically enacted its law to relieve the financial
crisis for nonpublic schools. The state viewed the program as supporting "purely secu-
lar educational objectives." Id.
152. Id. at 607. Rhode Island enacted its law in response to a legislative finding that
the quality of education in nonpublic schools was threatened by rapidly rising salaries
needed to attract good teachers. Id.
153. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. These statements came immediately after the Court
had discussed Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson. The Court was probably
trying to limit the rhetoric of the "wall" to arrive at a middle ground somewhere between
Everson and Allen. It is highly unlikely that the Court would have failed to recognize
that Justice Black's opinions relied upon the "high and impregnable wall" metaphor,
since Justice Black cited so forcefully to the metaphor.
154. Id. at 614. The Court further noted that its prior decisions interpreting the
Establishment Clause did not demand total separation between Church and State. Id.
155. Id. at 612. The Court quoted from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
in which it upheld the constitutionality of tax exemptions for church property. The
"evils" that the Lemon Court identified were "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
156. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
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Court had developed in Allen.', Before beginning its analysis of the
statutes at issue, the Court rejected the "wall" concept by warning that
"far from being a 'wall,"' the line separating church and state from
entanglement was a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier."'' 58
Nevertheless, the Court struck down both laws on excessive entan-
glement grounds.159
The Lemon Court cited a number of reasons in support of this
conclusion. First, it pointed to the "substantial religious character" of
church-related elementary and secondary schools and the impossibility
of ensuring that a teacher, unlike a textbook, would remain secular. 60
Second, as proof of excessive governmental interference and involve-
ment with religion, the Court cited the very provisions the states had
instituted to insure that funds would go only to support secular educa-
tion.'6 ' Finally, the Court focused on the probability of political
divisiveness along religious lines because these programs marked a
first step down the slippery slope of increasing demands for financial
aid to religious schools. 162
In essence, the Court used almost every objection that Justice Black
raised in Allen as a basis for its decision in Lemon. Yet, instead of
returning to the Everson "wall" as Justice Black had urged, the Court
specifically rejected this metaphor. 63 The Court's brief acknowledg-
ment of the growing crisis in education may explain its refusal to
invoke such an apparently concrete barrier as the Everson "wall."'' 64
157. Id. at 612. For the language of the full Lemon test, see supra note 131.
158. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
159. Id. at 624-25.
160. Id. at 616-17, 619.
161. Id. at 621-22. The Court described the nature of the entanglement as follows:
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that
such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of
control and surveillance . . . . In particular the government's post-audit power
to inspect and evaluate a church-related school's financial records and to
determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an
intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.
Id. at 621-22.
162. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-25.
163. See supra text accompanying note 158.
164. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. On the role of public tax-based support for religious
schools, the Court commented:
Finally, nothing we have said can be construed to disparage the role of church-
related elementary and secondary schools in our national life. Their contribu-
tion has been and is enormous. Nor do we ignore their economic plight in a
period of rising costs and expanding need. Taxpayers generally have been
spared vast sums by the maintenance of these educational institutions by reli-
gious organizations, largely by the gifts of faithful adherents.
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The concept of an absolute "wall" seems more directly at odds with
innovative methods of resolving the problems in educating children
than does a vague line only "dimly perceive[d]." 65 Lemon appeared
to mean that the states would be free to operate somewhere between
the boundaries of Allen and the murky line that it had set in Lemon. It
soon became clear, however, that instead of abandoning the wall in
Lemon, the Court had simply relocated it.
Only two years later in Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist,166 the Court made several references to the "wall." Nyquist
involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a New York law that
provided direct money grants to religious schools for building mainte-
nance and repair, tuition reimbursements for low income parents, and
tuition tax credits for middle income parents.167 The direct nature of
the monetary aid provided under the law must have alarmed the Court
because it made four references to Jefferson's "wall."'' 68 Perhaps the
most interesting of these references came in a summary of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
As a result of these decisions and opinions, it may no longer be
said that the Religion Clauses are free of 'entangling' prece-
dents. Neither, however, may it be said that Jefferson's
metaphoric "wall of separation" between Church and State has
become "as winding as the famous serpentine wall" he
designed for the University of Virginia. Indeed, the controlling
constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the
broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined.169
In a footnote following this statement, the Court admitted that its
"guiding principles" did not make its task in Nyquist "an easy one."' 170
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that it had previously "recognized
its inability to perceive with invariable clarity the 'lines of demarcation
in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."" 7' Finally,
the Court acknowledged that the wall, of necessity, was not "without
bends" and that it even "may constitute a 'blurred, indistinct, and vari-
able barrier"' on the question of entanglement. 72 After admitting its
misgivings about the relevance of the "wall," the Court proceeded to
Id.
165. See supra text accompanying note 153.
166. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
167. Id. at 762-66.
168. See id. at 761 & n.5, 772, 781.
169. Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 761 n.5.
171. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761 n.5 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
172. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
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examine the broad contours of the effect prong of the Lemon test.
As in Lemon, the Nyquist Court did not question the secular
legislative purposes of preserving a safe educational environment,
promoting diversity and pluralism among public and non-public
schools, and preventing the public schools from becoming overbur-
dened.7 3 The effect prong proved just as paradoxical for New York
in Nyquist, however, as the entanglement prong had been for
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island in Lemon. In Lemon, the Court's
decision to invalidate the law was based upon the same entangling
features that the state legislature had included in order to ensure com-
pliance with the Constitution.174 In Nyquist, the state tried to escape
this entanglement trap by minimizing its oversight into the way that
religious schools used the funds. 175 Nevertheless, the Court seized on
the inadequacy of the statute's controls over the use to which the
religious schools put the money to strike down the law for its
unconstitutional effect. 1
76
The major disagreement among the members of the Court centered
on the tax provisions. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Powell, invalidated the tax provisions because they benefited only
parents of children in sectarian schools. 177 The state could not cast this
as a general law, the majority concluded, when its precise function
was to aid private schools, "the great majority of which are sectar-
ian."'7'  Therefore, in the majority's view, the law's primary effect
was to advance religion by encouraging parents to keep their children
in church schools with tax rewards and incentives. '79 But as Chief
173. Id. at 773; see Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
174. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619, 621-22.
175. New York generally restricted the maintenance and repair funds to fifty percent
of the costs for comparable services in public schools. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
The Court found statistical criteria insufficient to guarantee that state funds would not be
used to finance religious education. Id. at 774-78. The tuition grants and tax credits
were not subject to any restrictions other than initial qualifying standards. Id. at 783-
87, 790-91.
176. The Court commented on the statute's deficiencies at several points in its opin-
ion, concluding that "[the] maintenance and repair provisions violate the Establishment
Clause because their effect, inevitably, is to subsidize and advance the religious mission
of sectarian schools." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779-80. Additionally, the Court stated "we
think it clear that New York's tuition grant program fares no better under the effect test
than its maintenance and repair program ... ." Id. at 785. The Court reasoned that New
York's tax credit plan is not "sufficiently restricted to assure that it will not have the
impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools." Id. at
794.
177. Id. at 783.
178. Id.
179. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790-91. In discussing the tax credit provision in his opin-
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Justice Burger pointed out in his dissent, the striking of a "special" law
that had the same permissible effects as a "general" law was inconsis-
tent with the Court's holding that the purpose of the law was
secular. 8 0 Justice White's dissent noted that despite its quotation from
Everson that "'[n]o tax... can be levied to support any religious insti-
tutions,""' 1.. the majority admitted that the state had not levied a tax
"for the purpose of supporting religious activities."'18 2
The reasoning underlying the Nyquist majority's opinion appears to
be the same as the unarticulated basis of Lemon: the Court's growing
concern with line drawing after it had lowered the Everson "wall" in
Allen. In fact, the Court commented that although Justice Black's
prediction that the failure to maintain a "high and impregnable wall"
would lead sectarian religious groups to "'cease to rely on voluntary
contributions of members of their sects while waiting for the
Government to pick up all the bills for religious schools"" 3 had not
proved true, "the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian
schools that periodically reach this Court abundantly support the
wisdom of Mr. Justice Black's prophecy."'8 4 This concern can also
be the only explanation for the Court's renewed fondness for citing the
"wall of separation," which was otherwise irrelevant to its decision.
Thus, despite all the historical evidence to the contrary, the Court
has associated Jefferson's "wall" with a strong, principled stand
against state encroachments on the First Amendment. But even as a
defense against state encroachments, the "wall" was always meaning-
less. On the one hand, the Court defined Jefferson's metaphor as "the
ion for the Court, Justice Powell included a caveat that foreshadowed a future opinion:
"Since the program here does not have the elements of a genuine tax deduction, such as
for charitable contributions, we do not have before us, and do not decide, whether that
form of tax benefit is constitutionally acceptable under the 'neutrality' test in Walz." Id.
at 790 n.49. Ten years later, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist in which Justice
Powell joined, Minnesota's tax deduction statute for tuition, books, and instructional
materials was upheld on that basis. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1983).
180. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 804-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's
point is well taken, but the Court's opinion is confusing on this issue. Although it
specifically held that the statute had a secular purpose, id. at 773, the Court stated that
"insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian
schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious insti-
tutions." Id. at 793. Although the Court may have been distinguishing the narrow prac-
tical purpose from the broad legislative purpose, Chief Justice Burger's point is quite
valid.
1 8 1. Id. at 780 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
182. Id. at 823 (White, J., dissenting).
183. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785 (quoting Allen, 392 U.S. at 253 (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
184. Id. at 785.
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principle of total separation; ' on the other, it simultaneously denied
its validity. 8 6 Defined as an absolute, modified by several caveats,
and used as a pointless defense against state action, the "wall"
appeared in Nyquist as little more than a banner for the majority.
Although the majority cited the "wall," none of the three dissenters 87
who wanted the tax provisions upheld referred to the wall.
Ironically, the "wall" suffered its worst abuse in the only case where
citations to it finally coincided with the downfall of a public aid statute.
The majority and each of the dissenters in Nyquist discussed the
mounting educational crisis and the states' substantial reasons for
enacting public aid statutes. 88 The Lemon standard was virtually
impossible for the states to meet, even though the Court has consis-
tently found that the states had valid reasons for trying to aid parochial
schools. 189 Yet, each of the Court's cryptic opinions gave the states
the impetus to try. After Nyquist, the Court's opinions in these types
of cases became more fractured; dissenters in cases that allowed state
aid to religious schools provided stronger defenses of the "wall," and
state aid programs became more palatable to the majority of the Court.
Thus, Nyquist and its banner waving turned out to be a watershed.
E. Wolman, Regan, and the Practicality of "Support"
The transitional case of Wolman v. Walter,'9" decided just four
years after Nyquist, contained enough dissent and confusion to satisfy
even the most cynical critics of the Court's previous unprincipled
decisions. Wolman was thus a microcosm of the difficulties created
by the "wall." The Court's search for a principled foundation became
apparent from the nearly incomprehensible cross-voting in the case.' 9'
185. Id. at 771 n.28.
186. Id. at 760. The Court acknowledged that "[lit has never been thought either
possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation." Id.
187. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist each wrote a dissenting
opinion. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 805 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), 813 (White, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 795, 805 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 813 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 815-
20, 823 (White, J., dissenting).
189. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983); Committee for Public Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 (1980), discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 218-51; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 150-65.
190. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
191. Id. at 231-32. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, V, V1, VII, and VIII, in which
Justices Stewart and Stevens joined; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Powell joined with respect to Part 1; Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Marshall and Powell joined with respect to Part V; Chief Justice Burger and Justice
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Even loyal advocates of the "wall" could not agree on a result. When
the dust settled, the only clear message was that the "wall" had fallen
from grace and the state had won a partial victory.
At issue in Wolman was a comprehensive Ohio statute providing
myriad forms of public aid to parochial schools. 92 The Court method-
ically applied the Lemon analysis and once again accepted as legitimate
the legislature's stated secular purpose. 193 Citing the "wall" only
once, 194 the majority upheld most of the statute. 195 Justices Marshall
and Stevens, by contrast, used the "wall" to take the rest of the Court
to task and urged that Allen be overruled.' 96
Justice Marshall urged a return to the Everson "wall" and blamed
Allen for its demise: "I am now convinced that Allen is largely
Powell joined with respect to Part VI; Justices Brennan and Marshall joined with respect
to Parts VII and VIII; and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined
with respect to Parts II, IIl, and IV. Chief Justice Burger dissented in part. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part. Justices White and Rehnquist filed a statement concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part.
192. Id. at 233. In essence, the statute authorized the state "to provide nonpublic
school pupils with books, instructional materials and equipment, standardized testing
and scoring, diagnostic services, therapeutic services, and field trip transportation." Id.
193. The Court based this conclusion on "Ohio's legitimate interest in protecting the
health of its youth and in providing a fertile educational environment for all the school
children of the State." Id. at 236 (footnote omitted). Although only three other Justices
(Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell) joined in the part of the opinion
finding the purpose legitimate and the remainder of the Court's opinion did not address
the statute's purpose, some of the programs in the Ohio statute were upheld. See infra
note 195 and accompanying text. Presumably, the various justices who joined or
concurred in the Court's judgment as to the portions of the statute that were upheld
agreed at least on this point.
194. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell joined Justice Blackmun in this section of the opinion.
195. A plurality upheld two sections of the statute: a provision permitting the use of
public money to purchase and lend textbooks to students at religious schools; and a
provision permitting the use of public funds to provide standardized academic testing to
students at nonpublic schools. See id. at 238, 241. Two different majorities of justices
sustained two other sections that provided speech, hearing, and psychological diagnos-
tic services and certain therapeutic services to students at religious schools. See id. at
244, 248. A third majority struck down two final sections of the statute. One section,
which permitted the use of public funds for purchasing and lending instructional equip-
ment to nonpublic schools, was held to violate the Establishment Clause because it "had
the primary effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian
enterprise." Id. at 250. The Court struck down the other section, which permitted the
use of public money to provide transportation to nonpublic schools for field trips,
because of its effect and because it created "excessive entanglement" between church and
state. Id. at 254.
196. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 257-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), 265 & n.2, 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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responsible for reducing the 'high and impregnable' wall between
church and state erected by the First Amendment to 'a blurred, indis-
tinct, and variable barrier,' incapable of performing its vital functions
of protecting both church and state."' ' Although he did not define the
"wall," Justice Marshall made clear that the line "should be placed
between general welfare programs ... and programs of educational
assistance."'' 98 Justice Marshall saw the proper line as the one drawn
by Justice Black in his dissent in Allen and his majority opinion in
Everson.'" He further explained that this line distinguished "between
programs that help the school educate a student," which would
generally be permitted, and "welfare programs that may have the effect
of making a student more receptive to being educated," which would
generally be forbidden.200 Accordingly, under Justice Marshall's
formulation, the entire statute would be struck down except for the
diagnostic services provision.20'
Justice Stevens also advocated a return to Justice Black's Everson
wall, but in a slightly different form than that proposed by Justice
Marshall. He characterized the wall as strictly forbidding any tax "'in
any amount ... to support any religious activities or institutions...
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 20 2 Other
than listing examples of invalid aid,20 3 however, Justice Stevens gave
little substance to his formulation. In contrast to Justice Marshall,
Justice Stevens felt that the "wall" would allow the diagnostic and
therapeutic provisions as possible public health services.2 °4 He took
this position despite his conclusion that as a result of the Court's deci-
sion, "only a much smaller amount [of money for nonpublic schools]
197. Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
198. Id. at 259 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
199. Id. at 259 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Id. at 259 n.5 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
explanation is confusing, however, because bus fare reimbursements could never fall on
the side of simply "making a student more receptive to being educated," and thus, under
Justice Marshall's analysis, Everson itself should have come out differently. Justice
Marshall's own analysis of the Ohio statute further indicates that his "line" would be just
as likely to lead to anomalous results. Inevitably, Justice Marshall found himself reach-
ing the same conclusions as the majority regarding the law's purpose and effect and mak-
ing the same distinctions between direct and indirect aid that the Court had made. See
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 260-62 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 256, 260-62 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
203. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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may still be involved. 2 5 With this remark, Justice Stevens eviscer-
ated his own idea that the wall prohibited a public tax "in any amount"
to be used to support religious activities'l and blurred his criteria for
determining when the wall had been breached.2°7
Justices Marshall and Stevens were no more able to agree on the
elusive parameters of the "wall" than were the Justices on the Everson
Court who had constructed it. The contradictory results and internal
inconsistencies in each opinion are, in fact, reminiscent of Everson.
According to Justices Marshall and Stevens, "no aid" did not mean no
aid; rather, it meant no aid of a particular kind. This type of "wall,"
one which lacks a definitive meaning, cannot help lower courts deter-
mine what aid, if any, is constitutionally permissible. These confused
dissents thus underscore one of the major reasons for the considerable
internal discord and disorder on the Court.
A comparison of these dissents to Justice Powell's separate opinion
illustrates a second difficulty created by the "wall." In his concurrence
and partial dissent, Justice Powell suggested a resolution to the
Court's problems. 20 8 First, he rejected the position that public aid to
sectarian schools is invalid because it necessarily aids religion.0 9
Instead, Justice Powell noted that such aid could be used to advance
general public and governmental interests. In particular, he noted that
parochial schools provide a type of tax relief to the general public,210
and he recognized the states' interest in promoting high-quality educa-
tion for all school children.1 If the states were prohibited from
205. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 266 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
206. See supra text accompanying note 202.
207. Apparently, Justice Stevens saw no inconsistency in his position, for he
concluded his brief dissent by raising the Everson "wall" once again:
This Court's efforts to improve on the Everson test have not proved success-
ful. "Corrosive precedents" have left us without firm principles on which to
decide these cases. As this case demonstrates, the States have been encouraged
to search for new ways of achieving forbidden ends. What should be a "high
and impregnable" wall between church and state, has been reduced to a
"blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier." The result has been, as Clarence
Darrow predicted, harm to "both the public and the religion that [this aid]
would pretend to serve."
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(alteration in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).
208. Id. at 262-64 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Powell recognized that the Court's decisions in previous Establishment Clause cases, a
"troubling area" of constitutional interpretation, seemed "arbitrary." Id.
209. Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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permitting some public funds to be used by nonpublic schools, Justice
Powell observed, "[tihe persistent desire of a number of States to find
proper means of helping sectarian education to survive would be
doomed, 2 t2 which would be a "harsh result" and contrary to the
public interest.213 Based on these concerns, Justice Powell suggested
a common sense approach:
At this point in the 20th century . . . [t]he risk of significant
religious or denominational control over our democratic
processes-or even of deep political division along religious
lines-is remote, and when viewed against the positive contribu-
tions of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely tolerable
in light of the continuing oversight of this Court. Our decisions
have sought to establish principles that preserve the cherished
safeguard of the Establishment Clause without resort to blind
absolutism. If this endeavor means a loss of some analytical
tidiness, then that too is entirely tolerable.
214
Justice Powell's frank assessment of the realities of the issue left no
room for any "wall of separation." He found the entire statute accept-
able with one minor reservation.215 In particular, he found the
statute's provision of bus transportation for field trips unobjectionable
because that provision was "indistinguishable in principle" from the
provision that the Everson Court had upheld.2t6
Without any reference to the wall, Justice Powell arrived at the same
conclusion as had the Court in Everson, thus showing that the wall is
generally irrelevant to Establishment Clause analysis. More impor-
tantly, Justice Powell achieved a result consistent with Everson
without referring to its "wall," whereas neither of the Everson "wall"
advocates did. This confusion of outcomes shows that the "wall of
separation," in addition to being extraneous, can also hinder the careful
balancing that constitutional adjudication usually requires.
Justice Powell's separate opinion in Wolman may have signaled that
212. Id. (Powell, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
215. See id. at 263-64 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Powell would not have objected to laws that provided educational materials to sectarian
students if those materials also were customarily provided to secular students. See
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 264 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He
only concurred in the Court's judgment striking the loan for the purchase of instruc-
tional materials because he viewed the loan as a "transparent fiction" that actually
provided the materials to the nonpublic schools rather than to their students. Id.
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 264 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the Court was ready to find a more sound analytical basis for similar
state legislation. 217 In Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan,218 the Court demonstrated the extent of its willing-
ness to revise its earlier positions and dismantle the "wall." In a five-
to-four decision the Court upheld a New York law that provided direct
cash reimbursements to parochial schools for costs incurred in
performing state-mandated testing, record keeping, and reporting.1 9
The Regan Court majority did not make a single reference to the
"wall."
Applying a less-than-rigorous Lemon analysis, 220 the Court had
little trouble determining that the law did not have any religious
purpose or effect, 22' despite the direct cash payments to religious
schools. Opponents of the statute argued that all direct cash payments
aided religious education.222 The Court, however, saw no constitu-
tional distinction between paying sectarian teachers and paying an
outside service to perform the same functions. 223  As the Court
explained its reasoning:
In either event, the nonpublic school is being relieved of the cost
of grading state-required, state-furnished examinations ....
217. Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
219. Id. at 648, 657, 662. The Court had struck down a previous version of the
statute because (1) it provided payments for grading and administering teacher-prepared
tests that could be used for religious instruction; and (2) it failed to provide a means of
insuring that public funds would be spent exclusively on secular services. See Levitt v.
Committee for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). The New York legislature revised the
statute that the Court struck down by eliminating the provisions granting payment for
teacher-prepared tests and by adding an audit procedure. Regan, 444 U.S. at 650-52.
After the district court struck down this revised version of the statute, see Committee for
Public Educ. v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the Court vacated and
remanded in light of its decision in Wolman. See 433 U.S. 902 (1977); see also Regan,
444 U.S. at 656. On remand, the district court noted that Wolman provided a "'more
flexible concept"' of state aid for religious schools than had Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975). Regan, 444 U.S. at 653 (quoting Levitt, 461 F. Supp. at 1127).
Accordingly, the district court finally sustained the statute.
220. Justice Blackmun leveled this charge in his dissenting opinion, arguing that
"[in order properly to analyze the amended school aid plan ... it is imperative ... to
examine the statute's operational details with great precision and with fewer generalities
than the Court does today." Regan, 444 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 656-57. The Court reasoned that using state-prepared tests to evaluate the
quality and effectiveness of education prevented the possibility of religious teaching.
Id. at 655-56. Similarly, the Court noted that record keeping (taking and recording daily
attendance) and reporting (annual attendance reports and annual reports on students,
faculty, curriculum, and facilities) could not be diverted for religious purposes. Id. at
656-57.
222. Id. at 661.
223. Regan, 444 U.S. at 658.
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None of our cases requires us to invalidate these reimbursements
simply because they involve payments in cash. The Court "has
not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden
because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its
other resources on religious ends." . . . [We] reach the same
results with respect to the reimbursements for [record keeping
and reports].224
After addressing and dismissing the challengers' entanglement
argument,225 the Court once again reiterated its position that not all
public aid, whether in cash or kind, necessarily furthers the religious
mission of sectarian schools.22 6 Finally, the Court stated the essence
of its decision: New York had shown "with sufficient clarity" that its
statute promoted legitimate secular purposes with little risk of advanc-
ing religion.227 With a warning that Regan was not to be used as a
"litmus-paper test" for the future, 228 Justice White summarized the
Court's more moderate approach to Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence:
What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid
categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end
of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity
and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the case
until the continuing interaction between the courts and the
States-the former charged with interpreting and upholding the
Constitution and the latter seeking to provide education for their
youth-produces a single, more encompassing construction of
the Establishment Clause.2 29
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun opined that the statute had an
impermissible religious effect and created excessive entanglement
between church and state. 230  He also observed that the statute
provided "a direct subsidy of the operating costs of the sectarian
school that aids the school as a whole.",231 Justice Marshall silently
224. Id. at 658-59 (citation and footnote omitted).
225. Id. at 660-61. The Court adopted the district court's finding that the audit provi-
sion was an effective means of insuring that funds would only cover secular services and
of guarding against inflated claims. Id. at 659-60. The Court also noted that the reim-
bursement scheme was unlikely to create excessive state entanglements because the
process was "straightforward and susceptible to the routinization that characterizes most
reimbursement schemes." Id. at 660.
226. Regan, 444 U.S. at 661-62.
227. Id. at 662.
228. Id.
229. Id. Justice White's summary was remarkably similar to the approach advocated
by Justice Powell in Wolman. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
230. Regan, 444 U.S. at 669-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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joined Justice Blackmun's partial dissent,23 2 demonstrating that he had
retreated from his Everson position.233 But Justice Stevens refused to
give up on the "wall. 234
Alone in his dissent and his citation to the "wall," Justice Stevens
criticized the Court's approval of a direct subsidy as one more ad hoc
decision made possible by the majority's Lemon analysis.235
Furthermore, he saw that Regan's "groping rationale" could be used to
uphold State subsidies to religious schools where virtually any state
requirement was involved.236 Addressing the entire line of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause cases, Justice Stevens
commented:
The Court's adoption of such a position confirms my view ...
that the entire enterprise of trying to justify various types of
subsidies to nonpublic schools should be abandoned. Rather
than continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch
together the "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier" described
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, I would resurrect the "high and impreg-
nable" wall between church and state constructed by the
Framers of the First Amendment.237
Justice Stevens' terse dissent exhibits his frustration and resignation
to the obvious. Without a single reference to even a "line," much less
to a "wall," the Court had finally approved the flow of state tax money
directly into sectarian schools. That the "wall" had been completely
razed was beyond debate, and Justice Stevens did not even bother with
an analysis explaining his use of the metaphor. Instead, he simply
held out the "high and impregnable wall" as a principled bulwark
standing in stark contrast to the Court's precarious and futile case-by-
case search for a more satisfactory doctrine. But Justice Stevens'
solemn convictions may have been driven more by his reverence for
the "wall" than they were enlightened by principle. Stripping Everson
of its celebrated "wall" language and focusing on its underlying analy-
232. Id. at 662. Justice Marshall's approach to the wall is itself a study in contradic-
tion. His insistence on a "high and impregnable wall" in his dissent in Wolman, 433
U.S. at 257, should be contrasted with his characterization of the "wall" in his majority
opinion in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), in which the Court considered
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause implications of compulsory military service
and concluded that "[the metaphor of a 'wall' or impassable barrier between Church and
State, taken too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis .... Gillette, 401 U.S.
at 450.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201.
234. See Regan, 444 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
235. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sis, Regan does not seem so far removed from Everson after all.
In Everson, the Court stated several constitutional principles: the
238state may not support religion, may not discriminate against
religion,2 39 and may not interfere with religion.24 Everson is correctly
understood as primarily concerning state support because its free
exercise concerns were attenuated at best.24' The New Jersey law did
not "hamper" its citizens' free exercise or "handicap" religion.242
Nonetheless, the Court looked at the problem of state discrimination in
providing public benefits to its citizens on the basis of religious faith to
conclude that bus-fare reimbursement was not state support.243 The
Court noted that general safety, health, and welfare laws do not
support religion; rather, they support society, of which religion and its
institutions are an integral part.244 Viewed in this way, Regan is an
extension of Everson.245
In Regan, the New York testing and reporting requirements had
created a recognized financial burden on all schools, which the state
legislature recognized.246 The local public schools already received
state funds to help defray expenses.247 If the public schools, which
had funds from their local tax bases to support them, could not afford
to meet the requirements, then the private schools could less afford
them.248 The financial burden could have eventually forced many of
these schools to close. Because New York did not intend to under-
mine education by monitoring its equality, it extended the state subsidy
to all schools.249 Therefore, lifting the burden on public schools while
leaving religious schools to sink or swim could arguably have created
two constitutional problems: religious discrimination and religious
238. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
239. Id. at 16, 18.
240. Id. at 16.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
242. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
243. Id. at 16-18.
244. See id. at 17-18.
245. One critical distinction that may well justify Regan's extension of Everson is
that the facts in Regan implicated all three constitutional prohibitions identified in
Everson.
246. See Regan, 444 U.S. at 650 n.3.
247. Id. at 650.
248. The annual cost to private schools of complying with the state law could consti-
tute as much as 5.4 percent of an individual school's personnel budget, with statewide
expenditures under the statute totaling $8 to $10 million. Id. at 665 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
249. See id. at 650 n.3.
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interference.250
The remaining constitutional prohibition at issue in Regan was state
support of religion, and specifically whether the state's subsidy of a
state-imposed administrative burden for all schools "supports" or
"advances" religion. Unlike in Everson, the state "aid" did not "help
children get to church schools" or "enable church schools to attract
more pupils."' ' Rather, the state aid was more likely aimed at main-
taining the status quo, and despite Justice Stevens' dissent, the Court
permitted this result.
F. Conclusions on the Court's Use of the "Wall" Metaphor
The Court's greatest difficulty in Establishment Clause cases has
been in trying to define the constitutional boundaries of the church-
state relationship with respect to state aid to religious schools.
Immediately upon its first use in Establishment Clause cases, the "wall
of separation" proved to be a useless concept. It never provided a
method of analysis and eventually became only a frustrated plea by
dissenters.
Trying to maintain a "wall" between religious schools and the state
is problematic because, as the Court has recognized, the state has a
strong interest in maintaining parochial schools. These schools relieve
the burden on an already strained public school system while provid-
ing competition and diversity in education. In turn, parochial schools
need some state assistance to keep operating. Although schools may
flounder without state aid, unlimited state aid may effectively create a
secondary public school system. The "wall of separation" could never
solve this complex problem.
Nevertheless, belief in the concept originally expressed in
Everson-that the wall of separation forbids state aid to religious
schools as an aid to religion itself-has never perished. It has a
bright-line, high-principled ring that tempts the Court when the issues
are difficult, as they almost always are in these cases. But it is the
"wall" itself, rather than the cold commands of the Constitution, that
has created most of the agonizing.
250. As Justice O'Connor has noted, a state makes a Free Exercise rather than an
Establishment Clause accommodation when it "lifts a government-imposed burden" on
religion. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
251. See supra part lII.C.I.
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IV. THE BUNDLE OF STICKS
A. What is a "Bundle of Sticks?"
One of the most familiar metaphors in the law is that of the "bundle
of sticks," which is used to indicate rights that make up an ownership
interest in property. Justice Cardozo first analogized property owner-
ship to a bundle of sticks: "[T]he bundle of power and privileges to
which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the
ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to
time., 252 This metaphor has become part of the Supreme Court's Fifth
Amendment takings analysis, but, unlike the metaphors previously
discussed, the bundle of sticks has served as a useful guide to takings
analysis.
One of the sticks in the bundle involves the right to enjoy one's
property free of physical invasion. Because the Court has determined
that physical invasion or occupation destroys one of the sticks in the
bundle, the invasion always gives a landowner a right to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment.
B. The "Bundle" as Guide
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,253 the Court determined that a
physical invasion compromises a right essential to the bundle of
sticks.254 In Kaiser Aetna, the owner of a private pond had made
improvements to the pond by constructing a marina in the pond and by
connecting the pond to a bay in the Pacific Ocean.255 The federal
government argued that' in so doing, Kaiser Aetna made the marina a
"navigable water of the United States," subject to the "navigational
servitude" of the federal government 6.25  At issue was whether the
government could open the water to the public without paying
compensation.257 Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court:
[T]he Government must condemn and pay for [a number of
expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"] before it
takes over the management of the landowner's property. In this
252. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928).
253. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
254. Id. at 180.
255. Id. at 166-67.
256. Id. at 168-69.
257. Id.
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case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to
be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without
258compensation.
The Court characterized the right to exclude others, or the right to be
free from a physical invasion, as "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property. '259
This right, the Court reasoned, would be violated if the government
could force Kaiser Aetna to allow the public a right of access across
their pond, for such government action went "far beyond ordinary
regulation or improvement for navigation.""26 Thus the substantial
degree of government-mandated invasion partially explains the Court's
decision.
Three years later, however, the Court found the degree of invasion
unimportant. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 261
Jean Loretto, the owner of an apartment building, filed a class action
lawsuit in New York state court against a cable television company.262
Loretto sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that
Teleprompter's installation of cables in her building pursuant to a New
York statute constituted a taking in violation of her Fifth Amendment
rights.263 Although the New York state courts held that the statute did
not constitute a taking,26 the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
any permanent physical occupation of property amounts to a taking.265
The State of New York had enacted the statute at issue to promote
tenant access to cable television service.266 Describing the extent to
which the cable occupied Loretto's building, the Court noted that the
cable lines ran across the roof and from the roof of the building down
the front to the first floor.267 Furthermore, Teleprompter had installed
two large silver boxes along the roof cables.268 The Court determined
that the installation of the cables and boxes constituted a physical
occupation 269 and concluded that "a permanent physical occupation
258. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-180 (footnotes omitted).
259. Id. at 176.
260. Id. at 178.
261. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
262. Id. at 421,424.
263. Id. at 424.
264. Id. at 424-25.
265. Id. at 441.
266. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
267. Id. at 422.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 438.
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authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve., 270 The Court did not base its decision on
any sort of "fairness" or "justice" approach, and it showed no concern
for balancing equities, for the economic impact of the regulation, or for
evidence that the property value of the building may have increased as
a result of the regulation. Since it had determined in Kaiser Aetna that
"the landowner's right to exclude [is] 'one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty,' ' '271 the Court disallowed the installation of cables because it
compromised one of the sticks in the bundle of rights.
The Loretto decision appears strange in light of governmental
actions affecting property in general. Various governmental agencies
commonly regulate the use of private property without violating the
Fifth Amendment.272 Even in instances where regulations diminish the
value of a private landowner's property by more than ninety-five
percent, the Court has indicated that there might not be a taking. 273
Contrasted with its use of metaphor in the previously discussed
contexts,274 the Court's interpretation of the Takings Clause is consis-
tently literal. Thus, although one may disagree with the Court's use of
the bundle of sticks metaphor, it does provide consistency and
guidance to lower courts. Because it informs government agencies
that any permanent physical invasion will be considered a taking and
enables them to tailor their actions accordingly, the metaphor is useful.
Indeed, one might argue that the Court has taken the metaphor too
seriously and has allowed the "bundle of sticks" metaphor, rather than
the Constitution, to guide its decisions.
C. Conclusions on the "Bundle of Sticks" Metaphor
The bundle of sticks metaphor has guided the Supreme Court in its
decisions regarding government-compelled physical invasions of and
government-regulated use of private property. The Court's adherence
to the notion that property rights are a "bundle of sticks" reveals how a
metaphor may actually serve as a guide to the Supreme Court, lower
courts, and the public. Every court and practitioner of the law there-
270. Id. at 426.
271. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
272. For example, zoning regulations are the norm in virtually every state and city.
In addition, federal environmental regulations govern the use of land.
273. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2919
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. See the discussion of the Court's use of the rational basis test and wall of separa-
tion metaphors supra parts II and Ill.
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fore knows that even the smallest permanent physical invasion of
property violates the property owner's constitutional rights. No
"walls" need be breached nor "tests" met. Thus, the "bundle of sticks"
metaphor is used to enlighten and guide. As a result, the Court has
shown that metaphors are not inherently ambiguous when used in a
legal context but are ambiguous only because the Court has usually
failed to take its metaphors seriously.
V. CONCLUSION
Paradigms and metaphors should help us understand new situa-
tions.275 Yet, as the foregoing discussion of tests, walls, and bundles
demonstrates, the Supreme Court's paradigms usually do not serve as
guides. The "test" metaphor is not useful because it is difficult to
predict which "test" the Court will apply to a new group or right. The
most troublesome aspect of the use of tests is the process by which the
Court decides which test will be applied to a particular group or right.
Similarly, the "wall" serves no purpose other than as a rhetorical
device that suggests an absolutist approach to church and state issues.
The uselessness of these particular metaphors does not eviscerate
the value of metaphors in legal discourse. The "wall of separation"
metaphor could be useful if the Court seriously considered the impli-
cations of its words. If the Court had meaningfully applied the "wall,"
our entire Establishment Clause jurisprudence would be different.
Thus, the uselessness of the metaphor stems not from the Court's
failure to choose a clear metaphor, but from the Court's unwillingness
to treat the metaphor seriously.
The Court's abuse of metaphor will ultimately prove disastrous.
The American legal system is dependent upon the use of language.
The words of the Supreme Court-provide guidance to lower courts and
practitioners. When the Court, as the supreme interpreter of constitu-
tional language, purposefully and intentionally hides its decisions
behind deceptive metaphors, it allows other members of the profession
275. The progressivity of the paradigm-that is, its usefulness in new contexts-is
critical. See Lawrence Tribe, The Curative of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989). As Professor Tribe
explains, "[a] progressive paradigm adapts in a constructive fashion to new 'data'-new
situations and problems; a 'degenerative' paradigm must be revised in an ad hoc fashion
to handle these new facts or contexts." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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to hide behind this confusion and encourages them to focus on
outcomes, rather than reasoning. Thus, although metaphors may be
powerful tools, the Supreme Court's use of metaphors frequently
undermines the communication and reasoning that forms the basis of
our legal system.

